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Introduction
In today’s compliant-driven environment, fissionable material handlers are inundated with work 
control rules and procedures in carrying out nuclear operations.  Historically, human errors are 
one of the key contributors of various criticality accidents.  Since moving and handling 
fissionable materials are key components of their job functions, any means that can be provided 
to assist operators in facilitating fissionable material moves will help improve operational 
efficiency and enhance criticality safety implementation.
From the criticality safety perspective, operational issues have been encountered in Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) plutonium operations.  Those issues included lack of 
adequate historical record keeping for the fissionable material stored in containers, a need for a 
better way of accommodating operations in a research and development setting, and better 
means of helping material handlers in carrying out various criticality safety controls.  Through 
the years, effective means were implemented including better work control process, 
standardized criticality control conditions (SCCC) and relocation of criticality safety engineers to 
the plutonium facility.  Another important measure taken was to develop a computer data 
acquisition system for criticality safety assessment, which is the subject of this paper.  The 
purpose of the Criticality Special Support System (CSSS) is to integrate many of the proven 
operational support protocols into a software system to assist operators with assessing 
compliance to procedures during the handling and movement of fissionable materials.  
Many nuclear facilities utilize mass cards or a computer program to track fissionable material 
mass data in operations.  Additional item specific data such as, the presence of moderators or 
close fitting reflectors, could be helpful to fissionable material handlers in assessing compliance 
to SCCC’s. Computer-assist checking of a workstation material inventory against the 
designated SCCC to enhance the material movement was also recognized.   The following 
three additional functions of the CSSS were requested by operational personnel:  additional 
record keeping, assisting room inventory Material at Risk (MAR) calculations and generating the 
material label to be placed on a storage can.
In 1998, a preliminary CSSS concept was presented to all key stakeholders for the feasibility of 
such an application.  Subsequently, the CSSS was developed with full participation of all 
stakeholders including fissionable material handlers.  In 2003, five CSSS workstations were 
deployed in the plutonium facility for beta testing and resolving any issues from the field uses.  
Currently, the CSSS is deployed in all laboratories in the LLNL Plutonium Facility.  Initial 
deployment consists of only a few of the full system functions described in this paper.  Final 
deployment of all functions will take a few more years to assure the system meets quality 
assurance requirements of a safety significant system.
1. Development History
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conducts a variety of research and development 
activities with significant amounts of un-encapsulated fissile material as part of its national 
security mission.  Compliance with government regulations, national standards, and laboratory 
policies mandate the need to maintain an acceptable margin of criticality safety in these 
activities.  Operating personnel involved in the handling of the fissile material must determine 
whether an operation can be conducted safely within the evaluated SCCC limits and work 
control process.
With the advance of personal computer technology, it has become practical for LLNL to provide 
operators with a more user-friendly tool to assist them in carrying out criticality safety 
assesments.  Relatively inexpensive database applications provided the ability to populate, 
modify, and update a database with the information necessary to assist operators in compliance 
with specific SCCC limits prior to a fissionable material move.  User-friendly graphical interfaces 
can be used for the entry and display of applicable information.  Data input can be acquired by 
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other instrumentation with an interface to a personal computer.  The availability of high-speed 
networks and data storage devices also provides an opportunity for distributed applications and 
shared file access.
2. CSSS Description
The system consists primarily of three interdependent computer programs that include: the 
creation of CSSS labels; the assessment of fissile material movements; and the modification of 
the SCCC rules set.
When a CSSS label is required for a package, a material handler accesses the Controlled 
Material Accountability Tracking System (COMATS) to input or retrieve mass data (Figure 1).  
The CSSS label program then accesses the same data that may then be included with other 
criticality information provided by the handler such as form, shape, contaminates etc.  These 
procedures require verification from a second handler before an adhesive label is created.  The 
cumulative data may be augmented with digital camera images of the package and is then 
maintained in the CSSS database for subsequent retrieval using a barcode scan of the package 
label part number.
Figure 1. CSSS data input and CSSS label creation
When the movement of fissile material within the Plutonium Facility is required, the CSSS can 
provide assistance to the material handlers to determine the appropriateness of the move 
(Figure 2).  If the material mass tracking system permits the move, the handler then accesses 
the CSSS to determine if the item is acceptable to the target workstation under the prevailing 
criticality limits and special conditions in force for the workstation.  Interfacing with COMATS, 
the CSSS will monitor the status of fissionable material movement on a real time basis.  Upon a 
handler’s request of an intended operation, it will provide specific workstation criticality advisory,
such as; verify that that item meets the basics of the SCCC that currently applies to the 
workstation.  During workstation operations, the handler can input the new part data formed in 
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appropriate storage container.  The CSSS will then print a unique bar code and other data on 
an adhesive label to be placed onto the can.  The CSSS will have additional on-line capabilities 
of displaying, per handler request, the authorized work control document procedure to assist 
handlers, and can acquire the fissionable material handler’s requests of material moves for 
future job training use.  One of the key features of the CSSS is the capability to provide various 
menus on the monitor screen to assist handlers in entering fissionable material data such as 
form, shape, packaging, and material data.  It also performs various calculation tasks to assist 
tracking of the room inventory limit.
Figure 2. CSSS data retrieval and workstation criticality assessment
An additional program is used to update the content of the selection menus, to add or modify 
specific limits, constraints, and special items allowed for a given glove-box, and to maintain the 
SCCC attributes used by the criticality assessment program.  The development of the CSSS 
involved the participation of all main stakeholders including facility management, program 
leaders, material accountability, fissionable material handlers, and criticality safety.  Many 
discussions were held to explain the CSSS and its uses and to solicit comments from the 
stakeholders.
3. CSSS Deployment Status
During the CSSS implementation phase, many minor problems encountered in the field 
applications were fixed. A Plutonium Facility Operational Readiness Review was conducted to 
capture and document required corrections or improvements for subsequent software releases.  
Since the pilot system deployment in October 2003, nearly nine hundred parts have been 
identified, labeled, and stored in the CSSS database.  Twenty-four systems were deployed for 
production use in October 2006, and have been used to collect data and label an additional two 
hundred thirty parts.  When software quality assurance is completed on the criticality 
assessment capability and the CSSS database becomes more fully populated with inventory 
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operational aid.  
Conclusions
Nuclear facility operations rely on many organizational elements in carrying out their respective 
functions. Any proposed changes such as CSSS to an existing operational setting will 
necessitate adjustments of many stakeholders in carrying out their operations. As such, it is 
prudent to involve all stakeholders in the planning phase of any such innovation. The Criticality 
Special Support System provides user-friendly assistance to fissile material handlers in
assessing compliance with criticality safety controls. Inclusion of data on moderators and close-
fitting reflectors, in addition to fissionable material mass data, has assured that these attributes 
of a given item are readily available to operators in implementing criticality safety limits. The 
data recording capability of material contents in storage containers will practically avoid the 
legacy fissionable material storage issue where the information of the stored item was lost years 
ago due to various reasons.  The use of a bar code system will also ease the retrieval of and 
tracking of fissionable material in a convenient way to facilitate nuclear operations.
